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EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM: A NEW CASE
FOR REDUCED FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN
K–12 EDUCATION
Aaron Lawson*
I. INTRODUCTION: A LEGAL LENS FOR EDUCATION
POLICYMAKING
A crucial part of the debate over education law and policy
asks: Who should be creating education policy? When
education policy is formulated, what is at stake is nothing less
than success in life for our nation’s young people. The twentyfirst century has seen a pronounced shift in the way education
policy decisions are made, as the educational policy making
and regulatory epicenter has begun shifting from the state to
the federal level, particularly with the passage of No Child
Left Behind (“NCLB”)1 and Race to the Top (“RTTT”).2
NCLB comprehensively reformed the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the primary federal
education law.3 Among the major changes were requirements (1)
that states establish yearly testing of students in grades three
through eight for reading and math and in three grades for
science;4 (2) that states establish standards for the adequate
yearly progress of its students, incorporating a goal of total
proficiency in all subjects by 2013–14;5 (3) that students be
allowed to transfer out of schools deemed in need of

*
J.D. 2013, University of Michigan Law School; B.A. 2010, Gettysburg
College. Many thanks to Nick Bagley for his many thoughtful comments during the
editing process and to the author’s family for inspiration.
1
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001).
2
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title VIII,
123 Stat. 115 (2009); Race to the Top Fund, Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. subtit. B, ch. II).
3
See WAYNE RIDDLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31284, K-12 EDUCATION:
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001 (P.L. 107-110) 3 (2008),
available at www.crs.gov (comparing the structure of ESEA pre- and post-NCLB).
4
Id. at 4.
5
Id. at 5.
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improvement;6 and (4) that states develop a number of new
accountability measures to measure the progress of students
with limited English language proficiency.7 The focus on
testing was meant to provide some accountability on the part
of schools to parents and taxpayers and focus schools’ efforts
towards groups of students in need.8
RTTT, on the other hand, was less a legislative program
and more a set of spending conditions.9 In order to receive
money from the RTTT fund, states must submit ambitious
plans in four core areas: (1) adoption of standards geared to
workplace preparedness, (2) building systems to measure
student success, (3) increasing teacher effectiveness, and (4)
improving the lowest achieving schools.10 States were
encouraged, as part of their funding applications, to develop
budgets reflecting the changes they proposed, and the
Department of Education provided guidance as to the size of
these budgets.11
For the purpose of this Comment, what is important about
these programs is not what they contain, but the fact that they
represent a much larger role for the federal government in
education. A growing body of legal scholarship argues that an
increased role for the federal government in education is a
normatively desirable development. One scholar, for instance,
argues that limited state bureaucratic capabilities, which she
asserts have developed compliance functions at the expense of
true policy expertise, counsel in favor of an increased federal
role.12 Likewise, Professor Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, who
served in the General Counsel’s office at the U.S. Department
6

Id. at 5–6 (schools failing to show adequate yearly progress for two consecutive
years are deemed to be in need of improvement).
7
Id. at 14–15.
8
See 34 C.F.R. § 200.13(b)(7)(ii) (stating that adequate yearly progress definitions
developed by states must apply separately to students in the following subgroups:
economically disadvantaged students, students from racial and ethnic minorities,
students with disabilities, and students with limited English proficiency).
9
See Race to the Top Fund, supra note 2, at 59,840–841. NCLB also conditioned
receipt of federal education funds on acceptance of certain spending conditions, but
was a comprehensive piece of legislation, as opposed to the Race to the Top fund,
which was simply a part of the stimulus package passed under President Obama.
10
Id. at 59,836 (describing RTTT as a “funding opportunity” and guaranteeing
only a chance at receipt of federal money in exchange for adoption of these standards).
11
Id. at 59,840.
12
Shannon McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for
Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1546–47
(2011).

2]

EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM

283

of Education,13 noting the persistence of interstate educational
disparities since Brown v. Board of Education,14 argues that an
increased federal role in education is necessary because history
teaches that states are incapable, on their own, of addressing
disparities in educational opportunity.15 Another scholar argues
that the central role education has always held in our society
necessitates recognition of education as a judicially-enforceable
fundamental right.16 Similarly, Goodwin Liu, recently
appointed to the California Supreme Court, argues that the
very text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the concept of
national citizenship at least authorizes, if not compels, the
creation of a “common set of educational expectations for
meaningful national citizenship.”17 However, increased federal
involvement in education is worrisome for other reasons,
explored below. This Comment pushes back on scholarship
that supports federal solutions for the nation’s education issues
and argues that countervailing considerations militate in favor
of less federal involvement in education.
Every state constitution, in contrast with the Federal
Constitution, contains some guarantee of education.18 State
13
Richmond Sch. of Law, Profile: Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Professor of Law,
FACULTY, http://law.richmond.edu/people/faculty/krobins2/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
14
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model
for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1689 (2007); McGovern,
supra note 12, at 1545 (arguing that interstate resource disparities necessitate federal
intervention).
16
Michael Salerno, Note, Reading is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left
Behind Act Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education , 5
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 509, 540 (2007).
17
Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330,
401 (2006). Notably, Liu does not actually think NCLB accomplishes this, but he
advocates for an even broader, though somewhat different, legislative response from
Congress.
18
Avidan Y. Cover, Is “Adequacy” a More “Political Question” than “Equality?”:

The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education
Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404 (2002). Education Clauses vary widely

in wording. For instance, the State of Montana declares, “It is the goal of the people to
establish a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of
each person. Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the
state.” MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1). On the other hand, New York provides only that
“[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free
common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” N.Y. CONST.
art. 11, § 1.
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courts split into two groups on how to give effect to these
guarantees: (1) by evaluating education policy under Equal
Protection by declaring education a fundamental right or by
treating wealth as a suspect classification,19 or (2) by evaluating
education policies under a framework of educational
adequacy.20 In either case, these clauses establish substantive
educational guarantees on the state level that do not exist at
the federal level and provide the courts with a role in ensuring
the fulfillment of these guarantees.21 These clauses also help to
create a valuable political dynamic, which has inured to the
benefit of children. As part of this political dynamic, courts
define the contours of these affirmative guarantees, and the
legislature fulfills its own constitutional duty by legislating
between those boundaries.22
However, when the federal government legislates or
regulates in a given field, it necessarily constrains the ability of
states to legislate in that same field.23 In the field of education,
the ability of courts to protect the rights of children is
dependent on the ability of legislatures freely to react to
courts. As such, anything that constrains state legislatures also
constrains state courts and upsets this valuable political

19

See, e.g., Rose v. Council for a Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
Horton v. Meskill 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
20
See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000) (advisory opinion
declaring that proposed school funding bill would violate state’s duty to provide
adequate education); Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999);
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
21
But see, e.g., Neb. Coal. for Educ. Adequacy & Equity v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d
164 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058
(Okla. 2007). A small minority of state courts, like those in Nebraska and Oklahoma,
have found educational rights to be nonjusticiable. This problem is dealt with at notes
161–167 and accompanying text.
22
See discussion infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text.
23
For a useful and succinct discussion of pre-emption doctrine, see Alexander K.
Haas, Chipping Away at State Tort Remedies through Pre-Emption Jurisprudence:
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 1929-30 (2001) (discussing
both field and conflict pre-emption). See also Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1916)
(inferring that while it is true that where a federal statute does not cover an entire
field, states are allowed to legislate in those areas omitted from federal regulation: “. . .
when the situation with which the statute dealt is contemplated, the reasonable
assumption is that by the omission to extend the statute to the full limits of
constitutional power it must have been intended to leave the subjects unprovided for
not beyond the pale of all law, but subject to the power which then controlled them -state authority until it was deemed essential by further legislation to govern them
exclusively by national authority.”). The contrapositive is where the rubber meets the
road for the purposes of this Comment: state regulation cannot cover the very same
ground as federal regulation.

2]

EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM

285

dynamic created by the interaction of state legislatures and
state courts. An expansive federal role in educational
policymaking is normatively undesirable when it threatens to
interfere with this political dynamic. This dynamic receives
scant attention in the literature described above. However,
mindfulness of this dynamic is crucial to the proper placement
of the educational policymaking and regulatory epicenter.
Constraints on state legislatures would not be as
problematic if the federal government had proven itself adept
at guaranteeing adequate educational opportunity for all
students. However, RTTT and NCLB have, in some cases,
proven remarkably unhelpful for poor and minority
students.24 These negative outcomes, of course, are not
guaranteed. However, the fact that federal involvement in
education has produced undesirable outcomes for poor and
minority students should cause policymakers to reexamine
whether it is most desirable for the federal government to play
such a significant role in education. This Comment argues that
it is not.
Using policies adopted in New York State in response to
RTTT as an example, this Comment argues that the federal
government should step aside to the extent necessary to allow
state courts more flexibility to protect the substantive
educational rights of poor and minority children. Specifically,
where federal constitutional rights are not at issue, federal
involvement in education should be minimized to the point
that state courts have an unrestrained ability to protect the
educational needs of, and ensure adequate educational
opportunity for, each state’s children.25 This Comment does
not argue for an end to all education policymaking at the

24

See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
Generally, the term “federal constitutional rights” in the context of education
will refer the right to attend a school not tainted by the vestiges of segregation. See
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 90 (1995) (“Thus, the proper response by the District
Court should have been to eliminate to the extent practicable the vestiges of prior de
jure segregation within the KCMSD . . . .”). However, the term might also extend to
bilingual education. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer held that a
law prohibiting instruction in any language other than English violated Due Process.
Id. at 400–03. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Court was presented with a
question about the substantive right to bilingual education, but ducked the
Fourteenth Amendment question, and settled the case on statutory grounds, id. at 566.
25
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federal level. Rather, it argues that the functioning of the
state’s court-legislature dynamic should act as a limitation on
the policies enacted at the federal level. The educational rights
of poor and minority children in particular may be more
efficiently safeguarded by putting the power in the hands of
state courts and legislatures, whereas recent federal programs
have taken that ability from the states in a way that may be
detrimental to the nation’s youth.
In particular, the expansion of the federal presence in the
education arena has changed policymaking dramatically.
Federal policy will be off limits to the remedial powers of state
courts and legislatures, limiting the array of options they have
when seeking to enforce constitutional guarantees of
education. Unless state courts prove themselves unwilling and
unable to deal with the structural problems created by
educational policies, the federal government should assume a
role that leaves sufficient space for state courts to operate.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part II of this
Comment briefly examines the history of education litigation
and outlines the contours of the political dynamic that allows
state-level government actors to efficiently protect educational
rights. Part III looks at recent federal policies and some of
their occasionally troubling side effects. In doing so, it also
explains how these policies interfere with the political
dynamic described in Part II and why that is problematic. Part
IV answers some objections to this approach to educational
reform.
II. THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC
The key to the effectiveness of state-level educational
policymaking is a political dynamic in which courts and
legislatures work together, but in their own separate spheres to
effectuate state-level constitutional guarantees of educational
opportunity. This dynamic has been borne out on the judicial
side within state-level education litigation. Although the
education litigation in the federal courts that famously deals
with segregation and equal access to public schools is more
well-known, education litigation in state courts, dealing
pertinently with a certain level of opportunity, is more
relevant to the current policy debate.
Section A of this Part traces the historical development of
education litigation, particularly state-level education
litigation. Section B then examines the consistent framework
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that courts across the nation have adopted for dealing with
education litigation. Finally, Section C looks at how this
framework translates into a judicially manageable role for the
courts in education litigation, and the political dynamic that is
so crucial to education reform.

A. The Historical Development of State Education Litigation
Although only state constitutions, and not the Federal
Constitution, contain language creating a substantive right to
education in some form, education litigation began on the
federal level.26 The first wave of education litigation is the
most well-known. Through the Fourteenth Amendment, this
wave of litigation sought to remove the stain of de jure
segregation from public schools.27 Ultimately, of course, this
wave of litigation achieved its principle purpose of legally
desegregating public schools in the landmark 1954 Brown v.
Board of Education case.28 However, as one contemporary
education reformer noted, “soon after the glow began to fade
from Brown’s initial luster, education reformers saw the need
to devise political and legal methods for ensuring the provision
of adequate resources to the large numbers of poor and
minority students who would continue to attend segregated
schools.”29 The Supreme Court held in the 1970s that Brown
did not require integration where any de facto segregation was
not the result of intentional state action, leaving students in

26

It is well settled at this point that education litigation occurred in three waves.

See, e.g., Regina Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State
Responsibility for Educational, Finance, Goals, and Accountability , 2007 BYU EDUC.
& L.J. 281, 285 (2007) (outlining the three-waves); Michael Heise, State Constitutions,
School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP.

L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1995) (same).
27
See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v.
Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).
29
MICHAEL A. REBELL, ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL:
CONFERENCE SUMMARY 220 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002). Indeed, the Swann
Court seemed to recognize, despite the optimism of the era, that some schools would
still be virtually one race, despite the efforts of the school district authorities, and the
District Courts. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1971).
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underperforming urban schools without any recourse to the
Fourteenth Amendment.30 Thus, advocates began to search for
new legal tools with which to challenge subpar schools.31
As a result, a second wave of litigation commenced that
focused on providing all students with an adequate
educational opportunity. This second wave targeted “wealthbased inequities in the nation’s education system, which
allegedly led to children from poorer school systems receiving
worse educations than children from wealthier school systems .
. . .”32 Typically, these poorer school systems were also
predominantly filled with minority students, for whom
educational opportunity was already endangered, even putting
to one side these wealth-based inequities.33
Noting that the inequity in educational opportunity came
directly from the inequity of the funding system in many
states, education reformers initially premised the second wave
of litigation attacking these funding schemes on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1973, one
of these cases quickly made its way to the Supreme Court. In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, parents
of schoolchildren in property-poor districts alleged that Texas’
school-funding system, premised on the levying of property
taxes, violated the guarantee of equal protection.34 The Texas
school-funding system had been developed at a time when
Texas had a predominantly rural, dispersed population.35
However, the discovery of oil had changed Texas’
demographic landscape. Although the state had undertaken to
remedy the funding problems caused by the population shift,
its solution, particularly property taxes, was premised on the
amount of assessable property within a given school district.36
Because of huge disparities in the assessed value of property
and size of the student population from one district to the
next, major per-pupil funding disparities existed.37 Still, the

30

See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
REBELL, supra note 29, at 221–26.
32
Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The
Alabama Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 559, 560 (1995).
33
See REBELL, supra note 29, at 220.
34
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
35
Id. at 8–9.
36
Id. at 9–10.
37
Id. at 11–15 (describing the differences in demographics and funding between
two school districts).
31
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Supreme Court held that Texas’ school funding system did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, even though one
dissenting Justice described the system that resulted as “chaotic
and unjust.”38 Significantly, the Court also held that strict
scrutiny was not required of state and local education finance
decisions, indicating that education is neither a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution nor the impoverished a
suspect class.39
State-level education litigation is largely a reaction to
Rodriguez and the inability or unwillingness of federal courts
to do what is needed to truly remedy the underlying problems
in many of our educational systems.40 State constitutional law
provided two new opportunities for success following
Rodriguez. First, state guarantees of equal protection are not
necessarily co-extensive with their federal analogues, allowing
for protection of education as a fundamental right within the
state constitution, notwithstanding Rodriguez.41 Second, every
state constitution contains an additional textual hook: a
guarantee of education in its constitution,42 indicating that
38

Id. at 55 (“we cannot say that such disparities are the product of a system that is
so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory”); id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
39
Id. at 44.
40
REBELL, supra note 29, at 223–25 (outlining ways in which Supreme Court
refused to engage financial equity debates because of the lack of “manageable
standards”); Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State
Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2241–42 (2003) (“[Education
Clauses] gained little attention until federal court doors were closed to education
reformers.”); Umpstead, supra note 26, at 285.
41
The fact that some states analyze education claims under state Equal
Protection clauses, while the federal Equal Protection clause contains no such
guarantee, is demonstrative of this point. As well, Justice Brennan issued a call for
state courts to expand protection beyond the scope found within the federal
constitution, writing that:
[T]he very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear
call to state courts to step into the breach. With the federal locus of our double
protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the states betray the trust the
Court has put in them. And if that trust is, for the Court, strong enough to override
the risk that some states may not live up to it, how much more strongly should we
trust state courts whose manifest purpose is to expand constitutional protections. With
federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond by increasing their own.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
42
Cover, supra note 18, at 404. See also Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for
All: A Right, An Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 65–67 (1987).
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education is afforded a higher status on the state level than on
the federal level.
Litigators at the state level proceeded under two theories:
first, Equal Protection and then educational adequacy. Some
equal protection challenges to education-funding schemes
initially met with success, even before the Supreme Court’s
Rodriguez decision.43 Today, a handful of states review
educational laws under an equal protection framework.44
However, many state courts, following the Supreme Court’s
lead, have been reluctant to declare that their own state
constitutions made education a fundamental constitutional
right.45 Courts have declared that “local control of schools
served as the rational basis” for many funding schemes with a
disparate impact, and some courts “criticized plaintiffs for
failing to show that funding disparities had a negative impact
on school children.”46 When state-level Equal Protection failed
reformers, they turned to educational adequacy theories,
inaugurating the third wave of educational reform litigation.
Educational adequacy challenges were premised on
persuading state courts to endorse a reading of state
constitutions that required that each child be provided with an
“adequate” education.47 Adequacy litigation also met with
success because the states themselves provided the remedy.48 In
response to new studies suggesting that declining educational
performance was threatening America’s position as the world
superpower, states began creating academic requirements and
testing standards in the mid-1980s.49 These standards provided
the vague concept of adequacy with substantive content,
43
44

See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) .
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);

DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford Cnty., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
45
See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 642 (Idaho 1975); Northshore Sch.
Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 200 (Wash. 1974); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273,
279–88 (N.J. 1973).
46
Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies, 27
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 75 (2004).
47
MARTHA MCCARTHY & PAUL DEIGNAN, WHAT LEGALLY CONSTITUTES AN
ADEQUATE PUBLIC EDUCATION? 7–8, 16–23 (1982) (writing that New York had premised
its education litigation decisions on something other than the state constitution’s
Education Clause, which is no longer the case).
48
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 75 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“Neither the majority nor appellants inform us how judicially manageable
standards are to be derived for determining how much education is ‘enough’ to excuse
constitutional discrimination.”).
49
REBELL, supra note 29, at 229.
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instead of leaving it as an aspirational goal with no clear end
point.50 As one reformer put it, “standards-based reform also
put into focus the fundamental goals and purposes of the
nation’s system of public education” and gave “contemporary
significance” to Founding-era educational provisions.51
The standards-based reform movement proved to be a
significant boon to the reform movement, such that adequacy
reform lawsuits succeeded in the vast majority of states where
plaintiffs had not prevailed under equal protection theories.52
Courts in some states cited specifically to the new state-level
academic standards when declaring inadequacy.53 Thus, by the
end of these three waves of education litigation, reformers
could use one of two legal theories and find success in just
about any state.

B. How Courts Rule on Education Cases
Under either legal theory—equal protection or adequacy—
courts across the nation have followed a similar path when
passing judgment on education finance schemes. Standards
provide guideposts for courts ruling on educational adequacy,
and while these guideposts are helpful for framing either the
problem or the remedy, they do not substitute for legal
analysis. Noted education policy reformer Michael Rebell
identifies four consistent policy themes that dominate
educational case law.54 Although legislatively-adopted
50
51

Id. at 230.
Id. Cf. Kagan, supra note 40, at 2249–50 (arguing that the use of standards in

this manner is flawed and without solid constitutional grounding).
52
See Daniel Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure
of Making a Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 780 (2008). According to
the National Education Access Network, as of July 2012, Adequacy Plaintiffs have
been successful in twenty-three of thirty-six cases. Nat’l Access Network, Education
Adequacy Liability Decisions Since 1989 (July 2012), http://schoolfunding.info/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/School-Funding-%E2%80%98Adequacy%E2%80%99Decisions-by-Outcome4.pdf.
53
Morgan et al., supra note 32, at 566–67 (citing Alabama Coal. for Equity, Inc. v.
Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of
the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 154 (Ala. 1993)).
54
REBELL, supra note 29, at 239 (“This constitutional core emphasizes that an
adequate education must (1) prepare students to become citizens and economic
participants in a democratic society; (2) relate to contemporary, not archaic educational
needs; (3) be pegged to a ‘more than a minimal’ level; and (4) focus on opportunity,
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standards provide a useful starting point, the analysis of this
constitutionally-grounded guarantee traces these policies and is
thus more fulsome.55
Rebell’s first policy theme recognizes that educational
policies should prepare students to be citizens and economic
participants in an economic society.56 This is a historic goal of
education reform and policymaking. The idea of education
being a fundamental part of American citizenship and success
traces to the nation’s founding. Thomas Jefferson, for
instance, recognized that some degree of education was
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in America’s open political system.57 Similarly,
Benjamin Franklin expressed a belief that education was vital
to the success of American society.58 Such impulses have well
outlasted the founding. The ideology behind mid-nineteenthcentury education reforms at the state level was one that
recognized education as “inextricably linked to America’s
continued growth and success.”59 Horace Mann, for instance,
argued that a common school system was necessary “‘to train
productive workers and loyal citizens.”60 As such, courts like
New York’s Court of Appeals asserted that “a sound basic
education conveys not merely skills, but skills fashioned to
meet a practical goal: meaningful civic participation in
contemporary society.”61
rather than outcome.”).
55
As well, although courts are mindful of their policymaking limitations, to
adopt learning standards as the meaning of “adequacy” would “be to cede to a state
agency the power to define a constitutional right.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v.
State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003).
56
REBELL, supra note 29, at 239.
57
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting President Jefferson’s
proposition).
58
Benjamin Franklin, Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in
Pensilvania (1749), available at www.archives.upenn.edu/primdocs/1749proposals.html.
In his Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pensilvania , available at
www.archives.upenn.edu/primdocs/1749proposals.html. Benjamin Franklin declared in
the first sentence, “The good Education of Youth has been esteemed by wise Men in
all Ages, as the surest Foundation of the Happiness both of private Families and of
Common-wealths. Almost all Governments have therefore made it a principal Object
of their Attention, to establish and endow with proper Revenues, such Seminaries of
Learning, as might supply the succeeding Age with Men qualified to serve the Publick
with Honour to themselves, and to their Country.”
59
Kagan, supra note 40, at 2268.
60
See Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School
Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1636 (2007).
61
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 330 (N.Y.
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The second policy theme Rebell identifies is that
educational policies need to relate to contemporary, rather
than archaic, educational needs.62 Case law establishes that
courts and legislatures have a duty to be mindful of changes in
educational scholarship, in pedagogy, and in educational
needs.63 For example, in Alabama, the state Supreme Court
interpreted Alabama’s constitutional education provision to
“impl[y] a continuing obligation to ensure compliance with
evolving educational standards.”64 An awareness of “evolving
educational standards” was necessary because, ultimately, an
“appropriate” education would prepare students “for the
responsible duties of life.”65 Because those responsible duties
change, so must the education provided by the state. Similarly,
in Massachusetts, the state Supreme Court established that
“[t]he content of the duty to educate which the [state]
Constitution places on the Commonwealth necessarily will
evolve together with our society.”66 In Washington, the state
Supreme Court held that “the State’s constitutional duty goes
beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic” because state
courts “must interpret the constitution in accordance with the
demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of
being atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original
meaning.”67 This policy theme implies an affirmative duty for
courts and legislatures to understand how the policies they
enact affect a student’s ability to participate in society.
The third overarching policy theme is that educational
adequacy needs to be calibrated to “more than a minimal”
level.68 This policy has more relevance to adequacy suits than
equity suits. The New York State Court of Appeals, for
2003). See also Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 of Crawford Cnty., 651 S.W.2d 90, 93
(Ark. 1983) (“Education becomes the essential prerequisite that allows our citizens to be
able to appreciate, claim and effectively realize their established rights.”).
62
REBELL, supra note 29, at 239.
63
See, e.g., Alabama Coal. for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107
(Ala. 1993).
64
Id. at 154.
65
66

Id.

McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993).
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978).
68
REBELL, supra note 29, at 239.
67
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instance, stated that “students require more than an eighthgrade education to function productively as citizens, and that
the mandate of the Education Article for a sound basic
education should not be pegged to the eighth or ninth grade . .
. .”69 This is an implicit recognition that educational adequacy
must mean more than what is already guaranteed at the federal
level, since adequacy litigation would be useless if it only
duplicated federal, and sometimes state, equal protection
outcomes.70 In Rodriguez, the Court indicated that the denial
of all education would violate equal protection.71 Particularly
in states where state guarantees of equal protection are broader
than the federal analogue, holding that educational adequacy
is satisfied by a bare minimum of education would render the
various state constitutional education clauses entirely
superfluous, because Rodriguez indicates that that work is
done by equal protection.72
Finally, the fourth policy theme recognizes that education
cases focus more on opportunity rather than outcome.73 As the
New York Court of Appeals put it, “plaintiffs have a right not
to equal state funding but to schools that provide the
opportunity for a sound basic education.”74 Tennessee’s
Supreme Court noted in perhaps stronger language that “the
legislature’s constitutional mandate is to maintain and support
a system of public education that affords substantially equal
educational opportunities to all students.”75 In Montana, the
69

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 331 (N.Y. 2003).
If the various Education Articles and Equal Protection Clauses produced
identical substantive guarantees, this would render the education clauses essentially
superfluous, in violation of a well-settled canon of construction. See Stephen M.
Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV.
115, 121–30 (2010) (discussing what the author refers to as the “superfluity canon”).
71
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (“Whatever merit
appellees’ argument might have if a State’s financing system occasioned an absolute
denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no
basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative
differences in spending levels are involved and where—as is true in the present case—no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”).
72
But see Charlet v. Legislature of State, 713 So. 2d 1199, 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(“If some funding is being provided by the State to every school district, the State has
met whatever quantification may be implied by the word ‘minimum’ in the
constitutional provision.”).
73
REBELL, supra note 29, at 239.
74
CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 346.
75
Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWhorter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Tenn. 2002).
70
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state Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the guarantee of
equality of educational opportunity applies to each person of
the State of Montana, and is binding upon all branches of
government whether at the state, local, or school district
level.”76 One commentator has found it “surprising” how many
cases decided within the “adequacy” framework focused on
“equality of educational opportunity” or “comparability.”77
There is no similar focus on outcome.
As courts have applied this policy framework, a remarkably
consistent cause of action has developed. In many states, courts
consciously look at state inputs and outputs within the
educational system, determining whether the resources
invested in an education system are sufficient to provide
students with an adequate opportunity to receive a quality
education.78 These policies form the basis of the political
dynamic that is key to educational reform on the state level
because they are not policies that relate to specific educational
programs, but rather to constitutional text. These policies are
the tools that state courts use to ensure legislative fidelity to
their constitutional duties.

C. The Interplay Between Courts and Legislatures
After a court declares that an educational system is
constitutionally inadequate, there is a need to define a remedy.
It is the remedial phase,79 rather than the demonstration of
76

Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989).
James Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1223, 1232–33 (2008).
78
Compare Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666
(N.Y. 1995) (“If the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources made
available under the present system are adequate to provide children with the
opportunity to obtain these essential skills, the State will have satisfied its
constitutional obligation.”) with Morgan et al., supra note 30 (the authors, the lead
litigators in the Alabama educational adequacy case Harper v. Hunt, discuss the
various ways in which they used inputs and outputs to establish constitutional
inadequacy in Alabama’s educational system.).
79
By “remedial phase,” the author means that part of a given education lawsuit
in which the court determines at least the outlines of a remedy to the identified
constitutional violation. In many lawsuits, the declaration of inadequacy and the
development of the remedy will not be separate phases of the trial, although they may
be, particularly where the state legislature completely ignores or is insufficiently
attentive to the dictates of the state courts.
77
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inadequacy, that is the difficult part of education litigation.80
Courts’ own institutional concerns are at their apex in the
context of education funding, where allocation of state
monies is a quintessentially legislative function, as is the
weighing of competing policy choices.81 As such, courts have
exhibited a “propensity . . . to defer to the legislature for a
remedy [as] a workable compromise between the judiciary and
political branches . . . .”82 Moreover, courts are more likely to
meet political resistance when they attempt to override
legislative choices.83
State courts, therefore, have, for the most part, followed a
consistent pattern in the remedial phase: after declaring that
inadequacy exists, and detailing the reasons why, the courts
remand to the legislature to fashion a remedy.84 In Alabama,
for example, the state Supreme Court declared that “it is the
legislature that bears the ‘primary responsibility’ for devising a
constitutionally valid public school system.”85 Although it
acknowledged that a trial court might have a role in
fashioning a remedy, it also recognized that “the judiciary
should exercise this power only in the event the legislature

80
See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2011) (“persuading a court that a state

has violated its constitutional duty to provide an adequate or equitable education is
only the beginning of the battle”).
81
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359, 363 (N.Y. 1982); Cora True-Frost, Note, Beyond Levittown Towards a Quality

Education for All: Litigating High Minimum Standards for Public Education—The
CFE Case, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1015, 1041–42 (2001).
82
William Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A ReExamination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform
Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1297 (2003).
83
See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH.

L. REV. 432, 457–71 (1999) (describing the struggles to remedy school finance systems
ruled unconstitutional in eleven states, and concluding that in about half of these
cases the relevant judicial decree was met with a significant amount of legislative
recalcitrance and public opposition).
84
See Koski, supra note 82, at 1259 (“Although the separation of powers doctrine
has proven flexible in describing the role of the court at the liability stage of the
litigation, all courts that have overturned their educational finance scheme invoke the
doctrine at the remedial phase.”).
85
Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d 869, 882 (Ala. 1997), vacated in part sub nom. Siegelman
v. Ala. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 819 So. 2d 568 (Ala. 2001). In Alabama, the public school system
was declared unconstitutional in part because “Alabama’s poorer school systems are
among the lowest spending systems in the nation, and include some of the worst
schools in the country,” and also because Alabama schools failed to meet regional
accreditation standards. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 126–27 (Ala. 1993).
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fails or refuses to take appropriate action.”86 In Texas, the state
Supreme Court was quite explicit that its role went no further
than declaration of a constitutional violation.87 In New
Hampshire, the state Supreme Court declared that the state
constitution conferred a substantive right to education on the
state’s students, and then subsequently expressed confidence
“that the legislature and the Governor will fulfill their
responsibility with respect to defining the specifics of, and the
appropriate means to provide through public education, the
knowledge and learning essential to the preservation of a free
government.”88 In Washington, while fending off a separation
of powers argument, the state Supreme Court asserted that it
could declare a constitutional violation and that it was “firmly
convinced the other branches of government also will carry
out their defined constitutional duties in good faith and in a
completely responsible manner.”89
However, despite their reticence to fully define a remedy
to a constitutionally inadequate educational system, courts do
not merely declare inadequacy and then remove themselves
from the picture, as this would likely do little to actually
improve the situation. Instead, courts give some measure of
guidance to legislatures in order for their decrees to have any
effect. Some scholars see the positive nature of the educational
right, as contrasted with the negative nature of most federally
guaranteed rights,90 as counseling an active judicial role.91 For

86
87

Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d at 882.

Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. 1989) (“[W]e do
not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the legislation it should enact;
nor do we order it to raise taxes. The legislature has primary responsibility to decide
how best to achieve an efficient system. We decide only the nature of the
constitutional mandate and whether that mandate has been met.”). The Texas system
violated the state constitution because “spending per student varie[d] widely [from
district to district], ranging from $2,112 to $19,333.” Id. at 392. The court found that this
was not an “efficient” system as required by the Texas Constitution. Id. at 393–94.
88
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
89
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 89 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).
90
See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864–74
(2001) (discussing negative and positive rights at the federal level and concluding that
the Bill of Rights is “essentially negative in nature”). Cross distinguishes between
negative and positive rights as follows: “One category [negative] is a right to be free
from government, while the other [positive] is a right to command government
action.” Id. at 864.
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instance, Professor Jonathon Feldman has argued that
abdicating from enforcement of positive rights on separation
of powers grounds “represents a serious misinterpretation of
the negative separation of powers doctrine.”92 This scholar also
asserts that “[a] court’s articulation of a legislature’s duty does
that
not represent judicial tyranny.”93 Recognizing
governmental inertia represents the greatest threat to positive
rights, he concludes that “[a]s long as the legislature retains its
core function as policymaker and allocator of public funds,
the courts may establish the parameters within which
legislative action must proceed.”94 Similarly, Helen Hershkoff
has argued for state justiciability doctrines that “respond more
closely to state and local concerns” and which are not subject
to the same constraints as Article III courts, in part because of
the positive rights contained within state constitutions.95 Both
Feldman and Hershkoff recognize that a right’s character as
“positive” does not preclude judicial enforcement. Indeed, a
paradigm within which state courts actively participate in a
dialogue with the political branches about vindication of those
rights is likely to produce more fruitful outcomes.96 Professor
Rebell has noted that judicial involvement in other areas of
public law, particularly administrative law, has proven
beneficial to the development of public policy and has not
been characterized by judicial ineptitude.97
Courts have taken up this charge to define the scope of
positive rights and do provide guidance to legislatures.98
Following a declaration of inadequacy, courts often provide
certain guidelines consistent with the positive character of the
91
See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001); Jonathan Feldman, Separation of
Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an
Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057 (1993).
92
Feldman, supra note 91, at 1060. For Professor Feldman, the term “negative

separation of powers” refers to a system in which power is strictly divided between
three branches of government, as it is in all U.S. jurisdictions. See id. at 1060.
93
Id. at 1060–61.
94
Id. at 1091.
95
See Hershkoff, supra note 91, at 1885–90, 1929.
96
A typical objection to judicial entrance into policy arenas centers on the
political insulation enjoyed by judges. While this is certainly true of federal judges,
who are unelected, this argument carries much less force at the state level, where many
judges must stand before the populace at regular intervals.
97
See Michael Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1531–35 (2007).
98
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989).
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substantive educational entitlement.99 In the seminal case Rose
v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,100 the Kentucky Supreme
Court outlined what it termed “the essential, and minimal,
characteristics of an ‘efficient’ system of common schools.”101
The Kentucky court also held that education was a
fundamental right in that state,102 arguably justifying an even
broader judicial role than that otherwise required for the
enforcement of positive rights. Courts operating within an
adequacy framework have also followed Kentucky’s lead
explicitly.103 Such guidance does not violate the very real
separation of powers concerns that play a large role in
education lawsuits. This interplay between the judicial and
legislative branches forms a political dynamic that creates the
conditions necessary for educational reform.104 Professor

99

Koski, supra note 82, at 1245–52 (describing the early attempts by courts to
outline the adequacy standard). Professor Koski refers to the “fuzzy standards” that
courts place on the legislature’s action following a finding of inadequacy as “the ideal
combination of restraint and activism.” Id. at 1240.
100
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186.
101
Id. at 212–13 (“We concur with the trial court that an efficient system of
education must have as its goal to provide each and every child with at least the seven
following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable
the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and
nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or
her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and
pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.”).
102
Id. at 206.
103
See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (“We
look to the seven criteria articulated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky as
establishing general, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy.”);
McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (“The
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky fairly reflect our view of the
matter and are consistent with the judicial pronouncements found in other decisions.”).
104
Professor Greenspahn recounts some encouraging evidence to this effect:
Elected officials, following state court orders, have increased spending by 11% on
schools in the poorest districts and by 7% in median districts. Increased funding for
the neediest districts has increased student proficiency in states such as Kentucky and
Massachusetts and improved school facilities in others, such as Arizona. Furthermore,
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William Koski, a noted education scholar and litigator, has
described the dynamic at play in education adequacy
jurisprudence:
A fuzzy standard allows plaintiffs to bring novel actions and permits the
judiciary to invalidate what it views as an unjust educational finance scheme,
while those same fuzzy standards permit legislatures to respond to the law in
the face of competing political demands. Law, under this analysis, does little
to shape legislative or executive behavior on the books. It is not selfexecuting. Litigation and judicial intervention, however, can influence
legislative behavior, but only to a certain extent. Litigation and a court’s
decision to strike down an educational finance system can serve as the
catalyst for legislative reform, as they can provide the political cover for
reform-minded policy-makers to act. And if the political branches do not
105
respond appropriately, the judicial “veto power” can again be invoked.

As such, it remains true that in the mine run of cases it will
be the legislature who is responsible in the first instance for
fashioning the remedy for a constitutionally deficient
educational system. It is for this reason that extensive and
growing federal involvement in education is troubling.
Both NCLB and RTTT attach significant strings to state
acceptance and receipt of federal funds,106 which are vitally
important if a state is to create a constitutionally adequate
education system. Although a state theoretically has a choice as
to whether or not to accept the proffered federal funds,107
there is no other actor that can replace the funds that a state
might otherwise receive from the federal government.108 Given

studies prompted by litigation in more than thirty states have resulted in revisions to
school funding formulas so that educational resources are delivered based on actual
student need. Greenspahn, supra note 52, at 780 (citations omitted).
105
Koski, supra note 82, at 1297–98.
106
For instance, NCLB required states to develop a plan, to be approved by the
Secretary of Education, to implement “challenging academic standards” (a term which
is narrowly defined), and to develop a way meaningfully to ensure that students were
making “adequate yearly progress” (a term also narrowly defined). See generally 20
U.S.C. § 6311 (2012) (“State Plans”). RTTT has, in its two rounds, required states to adopt
certain legislative priorities, required that a State’s Fiscal Stabilization Fund program
(itself required to receive a Race to the Top grant) be approved by the Secretary of
Education, and that there be no legal barrier within a state to linking data on student
achievement (a term defined by the federal government) to teacher evaluation, in
order effectuate further RTTT goals. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY:
RACE
TO
THE
TOP
(Nov.
2009),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. The limitations
outlined here are simply examples of the strings attached to federal funding in both
instances.
107
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
108
Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L.
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these budgetary realities, as well as the constitutional
imperative of educating children, state legislatures are
significantly limited in their ability to reject these federal
funds. Despite some initial resistance to NCLB,109 every state
eventually chose to accept the federal money and the attached
conditions, at least initially.
Recently, however, due to a provision in the law that
would have cut off federal funding if states failed to meet
almost impossible goals,110 most states were granted waivers
from some of the program’s more onerous requirements.111
However, these waivers themselves came with conditions
attached, as the Obama Administration used the waivers to
force states to adopt favored reforms.112 Thus, these waivers
simply represent the shift from one federal policy to another.
On the one hand, attaching such limitations on the use of
federal money is affirmatively good because it protects federal
legislative priorities; federalism is a two-way street and
“[c]oncern for protecting the states should not obscure the
need to vindicate the authority of Congress to choose whether
and how to spend its money.”113
But there is another side to this coin, which is that “[a]
state’s freedom from federal interference . . . is a freedom to

REV. 195, 212 (2001) (“states in the second group are severely constrained in their
decision-making by the lack of equivalent, alternative sources of revenue. There is no
competitor to the federal government to which these states might turn for substitute
financial assistance.”). Professor Baker also points out that this money might otherwise
be raised by the states through their own direct taxing authority, except that state
taxes already compete with federal taxes, and she asserts that “the states implicitly have
been able to tax only the income and property remaining to their residents and
property owners after the federal government has taken its yearly share.” Id. at 213.
109
See Sam Dillion, Utah Vote Rejects Part of Education Law,
TIMES
(Apr.
20,
2005),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/20/national/20child.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&po
sition=&.
110
NCLB would have required states to achieve 100 percent proficiency in math
and English by 2014 without an update. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2012).
111
See Joy Resmovits, No Child Left Behind Waivers Granted to More Than
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
6,
2012),
Half
of
U.S.
States,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/06/no-child-left-behindwaivers_n_1652574.html.
112

See id.

113

Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 89

(2001).
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make choices, not just a freedom to choose wisely.”114 As such,
although “Congress may use its spending power to create
incentives for states to act in accordance with federal policies[,]
. . . when pressure turns into compulsion, the legislation runs
contrary to our system of federalism.”115 This is particularly
important in the context of education. Where conditions on
federal money are too restrictive, they limit the array of
choices available to state legislatures in any given area of
policy. In the context of education, where a court will
establish limits on the exercise of legislative discretion but call
upon the legislature to formulate a remedy in the first
instance, a state court’s action will be less effective since the
legislature is already constrained by conditions attached to the
receipt of federal funds. Indeed, where the effect of the
federal policy is as harmful as some policies may be,116 the
court’s ability to vindicate the rights of students might be
entirely ineffective. This possibility becomes more plausible as
federal intervention grows.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
Restrictions on the ability of state legislatures and courts to
remedy constitutionally deficient education systems are
problematic, in large part because the federal government has
proven inept at formulating education policy that is responsive
to the needs of states. Nothing about the federal government
suggests that it should be unskilled at formulating education
policy. However, there are times in which federal education
policy is ineffective. These instances should force us to ask
whether and when it is normatively desirable for the federal
government to be formulating educational policy, particularly
when a substantive guarantee of some level of educational
opportunity exists in the vast majority of states but not at the
federal level. Accordingly, this Part describes instances in
which federal involvement in education has proven to be lessthan-successful.

114
Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 479 (2003).
115

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (quoting
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
116
See Part III.A infra.
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A. The Example of New York State
New York, a state that recently adopted a policy developed
pursuant to RTTT, provides a useful case study for the issues
raised by federal involvement. New York is useful as a case
study because of its relatively well-developed adequacy
jurisprudence, its recent fight over RTTT-inspired policy, and
the availability of relevant social science evidence. New York’s
policy was enjoined and then modified, but that result
developed apart from the state’s educational adequacy
jurisprudence. However, the very adoption of the policy raised
the specter of the issues considered in this Comment, making
this case apt for consideration.
Subsection 1 briefly covers New York’s adequacy case law.
Subsection 2 examines the policy that was proposed and which
would have been enacted absent action by the teachers.
Subsection 3 applies New York’s adequacy jurisprudence to the
policy at hand and considers the situation in which the
legislature might have found itself had the policy been enacted
and/or litigated in a different setting.

1. New York’s adequacy framework
New York’s Constitution requires that the state provide for
all children “a system of free common schools, wherein all the
children of [New York] may be educated.”117 New York’s courts
interpret this to require that the state provide a “sound basic
education.”118 Consistent with other adequacy cases, New
York’s Court of Appeals has written that “[s]uch an education
should consist of basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills
necessary to enable children to eventually function
productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving
on a jury.”119 The State’s constitutional obligation is satisfied
“if the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources
made available . . . are adequate to provide children with an

117

N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369
(N.Y. 1982); see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 665
(N.Y. 1995).
119
CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 666.
118
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opportunity to obtain these essential skills.”120
In interpreting whether or not this obligation is met, like
most courts, New York courts look at inputs and outputs: that
is, whether the resources used to educate students provide
students with adequate educational opportunity.121 The
“teaching” input has been described as “surely [the] most
important.”122 In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, the
New York Court of Appeals rejected an approach that would
have evaluated teacher quality using only one metric (principal
evaluation) and instead held that “teacher certification, test
performance, experience and other factors measure quality of
teaching.”123 And even where those factors may demonstrate
adequate teacher quality in some areas of the state,
the constitutional history of the Education Article shows that the objective
was to make it imperative on the State to provide adequate free common
schools for the education of all of the children of the State and that the new
provision would have an impact upon places in the State of New York where
124
the common schools are not adequate.

Thus, when a policy provides insufficient educational
opportunity in one area of the state, its sufficiency in other
parts of the state does not preclude New York courts from
declaring inadequacy.
New York courts further require a causal link between
state action and inadequate educational opportunity.125 Thus,
“allegations of academic failure alone, without allegations that
the State somehow fails in its obligation to provide minimally
acceptable educational services, are insufficient to state a cause
of action under the Education Article.”126 On the other hand,
“quality of teaching correlates with student performance.”127
Where it is state policy that has an identifiable and
quantifiable effect on the quality of teaching that schools are
able to provide and there is a causal link to poor student

120

Id.
See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y.
2003). See also supra text accompanying note 61; Alabama Coal. for Equity, Inc. v.
Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of
121

the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993).
122
CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 333.
123
Id. at 333–34.
124
Id. at 333 (quoting CFE I, 665 N.E.2d at 672 (Levine, J., concurring)).
125
CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 667.
126
Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (N.Y. 2003).
127
CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 334.
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performance, plaintiffs—generally school boards, school
districts, parents, and students—have a viable cause of action in
New York.

2. New York’s response to RTTT
Like many other states, New York participated in Phase II
of the Obama Administration’s RTTT Program, eventually
receiving $696,646,000 for their application.128 Pursuant to this
application, New York State adopted a policy that essentially
made student performance on high-stakes testing—testing that
carries with it incredibly high consequences, such as student
eligibility for promotion from one grade to the next129—
dispositive of teacher evaluations.130 Under the policy, student
scores on yearly high-stakes tests would have comprised 40%
of a teacher’s yearly evaluation.131 Fortunately, the program was
enjoined by court order because the implementing regulations
went beyond the scope of their enabling statutes.132 However,
the regulation, had it been enacted, would have weighed
heavily on the educational rights of New York’s racially and
socioeconomically disadvantaged children.
For instance, under this policy as it would have been
implemented in New York City, the measures adopted by the
Board of Regents would have rated 18% of teachers
“ineffective”—a number that would have been the highest in
the nation.133 Such a rating can get a teacher fired after two

128
N.Y. State United Teachers ex rel. Iannuzzi v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State
of N.Y., 929 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
129
For a general discussion of high-stakes testing, see Rachel F. Moran, Sorting
and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in the Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. REV. 107
(2000).
130
Scott Waldman, Regents Move Bar on Teacher Ratings, ALBANY TIMESUNION (May 17, 2011), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Regents-move-bar-onteacher-ratings-1382073.php.
131

Id.
N.Y. State United Teachers, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 703–704.
133
Yoav Gonen, “18%” of Teachers Get an F, N.Y. POST (July 22, 2011),
132

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/of_teachers_get_an_bud6BqF1yJ1nlrg9Oji4SO.
The evaluation system would also have permitted districts to use test scores from math
and English tests only, meaning that social studies and science teachers could have
been held responsible for test scores in other subjects. This provision of the Regents’
guidelines would also collapse under the analysis of this Note.
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years, tenure provisions notwithstanding. While such a number
would likely not have been replicated elsewhere in the state,134
the over-seven-fold increase in “ineffective” ratings that New
York City would have experienced would be a likely candidate
for repetition in other parts of the state, especially in urban
school districts. While the previous system for rating teachers
served the interests of neither students nor teachers (because its
subjective factors were subject to potentially harmful
manipulation by administrators),135 the new system the Board
of Regents attempted to institute may have been worse.
To begin with, the method used for evaluating student
performance—high-stakes testing—is generally flawed. Racially
disparate performance on standardized and high-stakes testing
is a well-documented phenomenon.136 This factor alone would
suggest that minority students who tend to be concentrated in
urban school districts137 will score lower than their white
peers—concentration in certain school districts logically should
have a heavier impact on those teachers, accelerating turnover
in those areas. Further, students attending school districts
without adequate facilities or without enough books to go
around will be disadvantaged relative to their counterparts in
more affluent districts even before the school year begins—
without regard for intelligence. In many cases, those students
living in these poor districts are minorities.138 In New York
State, these resource disparities still threaten to and often do
produce huge gaps in scores between affluent suburban and

134
135

See id.
See, e.g., Q&A on Teacher Improvement Plan, UNITED FEDERATION

OF

TEACHERS (May 12, 2010), http://www.uft.org/q-issues/qa-teacher-evaluation-andimprovement-plan.
136
See, e.g., Roy O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social Class Bias: A
Method for Reestimating SAT Scores, 73 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (2003). The problem is
not confined to the SAT. See Yasmin Tara Rammohan, Advocates Say Standardized
Tests Often Flunk Cultural Bias Scrutiny, MEDILL REPORTS CHICAGO (May 9, 2007),
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=35935.
137
Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education,
BROOKINGS REVIEW 29 (1998).
138
See, e.g., Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., Why Boundaries Matter: A Summary
of Five Separate and Unequal Long Island School Districts, CENTER FOR
UNDERSTANDING
RACE
AND
EDUCATION
7
(2009),
available
at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/95995.pdf (last accessed Nov. 5,
2012) (“racial segregation in public schools appears to persist across urban and suburban
contexts, and the distribution of ‘tangible’ educational resources—e.g. public funding,
qualified teachers, supplies and good facilities, etc.—roughly correlates with the race,
affluence and privilege of the students served”).
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poorer districts where the majority of students are of nonwhite backgrounds.139
But even apart from the ways in which race and poverty
serve as proxies for each other within public schools, one study
that “examined the relationship between a student’s location
and his or her achievement” found that “for the country as a
whole, the correlation [between the proportion of a school’s
pupils in poverty and its average achievement level] is about .5
or .6. No other single social measure is consistently more
strongly related than poverty to school achievement.”140 As
such, students in racially or socioeconomically disadvantaged
schools are already behind the eight ball with respect to
student achievement. The use of high-stakes tests to measure
student achievement gives already vulnerable students yet
another hill to climb. By making such performance dispositive
of teacher evaluation, another obstacle develops. As one study
noting the connection between race, poverty, and
performance, along with the raw numbers already available
from New York City, demonstrates, making student
performance dispositive of teacher evaluations in this way will
likely have the effect of increasing teacher turnover.
High rates of teacher turnover provide yet an additional
disadvantage for minority students, as teacher turnover
depresses student achievement and disproportionately harms
minority student achievement.141 This study documented

139

Data collected by the New York Times brings this contrast out in sharp relief.

See New York School Test Scores, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/new-york-

schools-test-scores (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). To take one example, the Syracuse City
School District, the fifth-largest in the state, is 54% black and 66% poor (however those
terms are defined). For every grade between third and eighth, SCSD’s pass rate was 30–
40% below the state’s median. By contrast, the Fayetteville-Manlius School District,
which is 4% poor and 2% Black, and which is in suburban Syracuse, boasts pass rates
among the same age populations which are at least 20% better than the state median.
140
John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”?: Racial Resegregation,
High-Stakes Testing, School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C.
L. REV. 1375, 1416 (2003) (quoting ALISON WOLF, NAT’L INST. OF EDUC.,
COMPENSATORY EDUC. STUDY GROUP, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POVERTY AND
ACHIEVEMENT I–II (1977)). A correlation coefficient of .5 or .6 means that roughly onethird of the variation is related to the proportion of the school’s pupils in poverty.
141
Matthew Ronfeldt et al., How Teacher Turnover Harms Student
Achievement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17176), available at
www.nber.org/papers/w17176.
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student performance and teacher turnover (whether a move
within the same school or a move to a different school
entirely) in New York City over a five-year period.142 What
these researchers found, importantly, was that the presence of
inexperienced teachers by itself could not entirely explain
variations or drops in student performance.143 Instead, the data
demonstrated that student performance dropped across the
board in schools that experienced higher turnover rates, even
among students who were assigned to teachers who retained
the same job from year to year.144 The authors posited a
number of reasons for this, including decreased institutional
memory and stability and the need to expend institutional
resources on the hiring process.145 Whatever the reasons,
another inescapable conclusion was that the effects of teacher
turnover were felt most heavily by minority students.146
This research suggests, incredibly, that had the New York
state teacher evaluation policy been allowed to go forward, it
might have had the perverse effect of actually harming
minority student performance over the long term, even
though it was ostensibly designed to improve that
performance.147 By tying high-stakes testing performance to
teacher effectiveness, there is a strong chance that the policy
would have accelerated teacher turnover, robbing minority
students, especially those in districts with a high proportion of
minority students, of a very valuable resource: a stable learning
environment.

3. New York’s policy within the adequacy framework
New York’s policy was adopted in response to RTTT. New
York is not the only state to move in such a direction.148
142

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 14.
144
Id. at 16.
145
Id. at 18.
146
Id. at 19.
143

147
Other researchers have found similar effects elsewhere. See, e.g., Boger, supra
note 140, at 1450. Professor Boger noticed that school resegregation in North Carolina
had coincided with NCLB’s Accountability Tests. Because some funding was attached
to these tests, and minority students did poorly, many of these schools and students
became more and more isolated.
148

See Promoting Innovation, Reform, and Excellence in America’s Public
Schools, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/fact-sheet-race-top (detailing some efforts made in pursuit of the goals of Race
to the Top, a competitive block grant program in which certain states are awarded
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Although New York’s courts managed to turn back a
potentially disastrous policy, the New York decision was
grounded in statutory interpretation: the trial court found that
the policy exceeded the power granted by the enabling statute.
A simple change in the statute changes the outcome, allowing
implementation of the policy outlined above. At that point,
what might aggrieved students have done to protect their
educational rights?
Posit for a moment that the New York policy just described
was to have all of the effects that appear, for the moment,
only to be frightening possibilities. Imagine that the effect on
teacher turnover was as great as was feared and that minority
student achievement suffered or, at best, stagnated while the
achievement gap grew. If education reformers brought suit
seeking to have this policy enjoined, they could present a
persuasive argument that the policy was unconstitutional
under New York’s current educational adequacy jurisprudence.
There is strong potential for an identifiable link between the
policy itself and its impact on educational inputs, particularly
the teaching input,149 and harm to poor and minority student
performance,150 and New York law allows for a finding of
inadequacy even if the deleterious effects are not felt
uniformly throughout the state.151
Thus, even if the governor were allowed to implement it,
this policy might be ruled constitutionally inadequate in New
York. But the policy was mandated by federal spending
conditions. Although the vast majority of education clause
lawsuits to date have been funding lawsuits, some
commentators now note the possibility of a third wave of
education litigation beyond the funding context.152 When
money in order to implement proposed reforms, including one reforming teacher and
student evaluation to student performance).
149
See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 333–34
(N.Y. 2003).
150
Cf. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y.
1995).
151
See CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 333.
152
See Bran C. Noonan, The Fate of New York Public Education is a Matter of

Interpretation: A Story of Competing Methods of Constitutional Interpretation, the
Nature of Law, and a Functional Approach to the New York Educational Article , 70
ALB. L. REV. 625, 628 (2007) (“What set Paynter and NYCLU apart from CFE II and its
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should a state court declare that a federally mandated policy
violates the state constitution? The system of teacher
evaluation in New York was struck down, but there was still
room in the applicable enabling legislation for a modified
policy that comported with the dictates of RTTT.
Constitutional infirmity, on the other hand, may not be so
flexible. Would the state legislature follow the state court and
reject the federal money? Or would it spurn the state court,
arguing perhaps that it is also entitled to interpret the state
constitution? That the federal government might place state
courts and legislatures in such an uncertain position is problem
enough to counsel against such extensive federal involvement
in education.
Many of the potential effects of New York’s policy have
been observed in policies adopted in North Carolina pursuant
to the Bush Administration’s NCLB.153 Although recognizing
that accountability measures like those created by NCLB shine
an important light on previously unexplored issues within
public education, Professor Boger nevertheless concluded that
NCLB’s accountability measures were a major part of a perfect
storm that was threatening educational opportunity for North
Carolina’s poor and minority students.154 Boger found that “the
convergence
of
racial
segregation
and
high-stakes
accountability testing all but dooms racially segregated,
economically isolated public schools and their students to
failure on state accountability tests, entrenching broad patterns
of grade retention, student demoralization and dropout, and
parental and teacher flight.”155 Therefore, accountability
measures “threaten to exacerbate the isolation of AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, Native-American, and low-income
children, with negative consequences both for their access to
highly performing classmates and for any prospect of
attracting better, more highly qualified classroom teachers to

predecessors is that the former two cases potentially prefigure the next wave of
Education Article cases, where the funding system is not the sole source of academic
failure, or, alternatively, where academic failure continues despite and adequately
funded school system.”).
153
Boger, supra note 140, at 1440–41.
154
See id. at 1448–49. The other parts of the perfect storm were the end of the
area’s Brown era desegregation decrees, and a prohibition on the use of race conscious
student assignment plans. Id. at 1378–84.
155
Id. at 1450.
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their schools.”156 The effects of NCLB Boger described in
North Carolina are exactly the kinds of effects threatened by
RTTT in New York.
Instances like these described in New York and North
Carolina call into question the wisdom of allowing the federal
government to set education policy on any kind of significant
basis. On the one hand, reforms like those undertaken in New
York, North Carolina, and elsewhere can prove and have
proven successful.157 However, given the importance of
education to our success as a nation, the fact that education is
explicitly provided for at the state level but not at the federal
level, and existing state-level policymaking levers, that such
reforms may prove and have proven counterproductive in
some instances calls into question the whole policymaking
endeavor.
For these reasons, policymaking on the federal level is
undesirable when resulting policies prevent state courts from
doing their part to ensure meaningful educational opportunity
and, in doing so, threaten the educational opportunities
available to poor and minority students. When the federal
government creates disastrous policy, there is no judicial
backstop, as exists at the state level. As such, the system of
education reform that exists at the state level should be
allowed full freedom to operate, facilitating the interplay
between state legislatures and courts, thereby providing the
fullest protection available for poor and minority students.
IV. SOME METHODOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS
As with any argument, this Comment’s argument that the
federal government needs to provide a larger space for state
courts and state legislatures to formulate educational policy
contains a number of contestable premises. This Part examines
a number of the more salient objections that might arise is
relation to the line of arguments advanced by this Comment.

156

Id.
See, e.g., Mark Schneider, The Accountability Plateau, FORDHAM INSTITUTE 6–
15 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://edexcellencemedia.net/publications/2011/20111215-The157

Accountability-Plateau/20111215-The-Accountability-Plateau.pdf (analyzing the success
of Texas in implementing NCLB reforms).
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The objections examined relate to the judicial involvement in
educational policy formulation that is part and parcel of the
state court-state legislature dynamic outlined above. This
dynamic assumes that courts can and should play a useful role
in education reform, but not all agree with this premise.158 For
those who see no role for the courts in education, there is no
need for the interaction between state courts and legislatures
to provide a limitation on the education policies that are
enacted at the federal level. However, even those who see a
role for courts in education reform might still raise significant
objections to a diminished federal role in setting education
policy. Although these objections raise important points,
ultimately none is a sufficient response to the contention that
state courts and state legislatures should be given ample space
in order to effectively create constitutionally adequate
educational policy.
In the first place, states have not always been very good at
providing children with even a minimally adequate education,
suggesting that national educational programs like NCLB and
RTTT might be necessary. For example, prior to the 1950s,
many states deprived students of equal educational
opportunity by segregating their schools. In 1983, the National
Commission on Excellence in Education published “an open
letter to the American people” titled A Nation at Risk, which
found that American students were falling behind their
international counterparts and that “the educational
foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a
rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a
Nation and a people.”159 However, if states are to be
“laboratories of democracy,” then the federal government
should not be in the business of ossifying certain educational
trends. The state courts have not had their final say on this
matter, and until they do, federal intervention on the level

158
See, e.g., William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 923
(2011) (Book Review). Professor Koski’s book review examines the debate over the
proper role of courts in education policy. Arguing that courts should play no role in
education is Eric Hanushek, who has written a number of books and articles making
this argument, such as the book reviewed by Koski. See ERIC HANUSHEK ET AL.,
SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDINGACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009).
159
Nat’l Comm’n on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for
Educational Reform, available at http://reagan.procon.org/sourcefiles/a-nation-at-riskreagan-april-1983.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
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found in NCLB and RTTT is premature.160
Some state courts, however, may never have their say, as a
number of state constitutions have clauses that require a strict
separation of powers, such that education is potentially the
province only of the legislature and no room is left for judicial
involvement.161 These clauses have provided the basis for a
number of state court decisions that have rejected attempts to
have state funding schemes declared unconstitutional despite
the existence of textual guarantees of education.162 However,
one study by Professor Scott Bauries has found that such
constitutional text is in no way dispositive of claims of
educational inadequacy.163 This is consistent with the recent
experience in Colorado, where the state’s highest court selfconsciously created a standard of review that tolerated local

160
See, e.g., Paynter v. State of New York, 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003). In Paynter,
id. at 1229, plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that New York’s school assignment

policies had led to increased segregation in the public schools, and thus poorer
performance by minority students, who alleged a violation of New York’s education
clause. The New York Court of Appeals rejected that contention because plaintiffs
alleged no causal link to state action, but at the same time recognized “that [plaintiffs]
cite research correlating concentrated poverty and racial isolation with poor
educational performance, and that evidence founded on such research might enhance
an otherwise sufficient Education Article claim. . . . Finally, as a logical and
jurisprudential matter, we recognize that in CFE I we addressed the sufficiency of the
pleadings then before us and had no occasion to delineate the contours of all possible
Education Article claims.”
161
See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 701 (2010) (examining the impact of explicit textual separation of powers in state
constitutions). For instance, the New Jersey Constitution provides that “The powers of
the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative,
executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as
expressly provided in this Constitution.” N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1. Professor Bauries
identifies consitutitional provisions in nineteen other states in which adequacy
lawsuits were brought that contain similarly explicit provisions separating legislative,
executive, and judicial power. See Bauries, supra at 762–72.
162
See, e.g., Neb. Coal. for Educ. Adequacy & Equity v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164
(Neb. 2007).
163
Bauries, supra note 161, at 746. Concerns over justiciability may be overblown,
anyway, as only a small minority of states that have been confronted with adequacy
challenges have declared state funding schemes nonjusticiable. See Tang, supra note 76,
at 1208. When Mr. Tang’s article went to print, only eight of thirty-two courts that had
been presented with the question had ruled on justiciability grounds. Since then,
Nebraska and Oklahoma have followed suit. See supra note 21.
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differences even though the state constitution explicitly
required the establishment of a “thorough and uniform”
system of schools.164 Indeed, instead of finding that
constitutional text governing the separation of powers has any
kind of consistent impact on the outcome of education
finance cases, Bauries concludes that “if a litigant in an
education finance adequacy suit were to succeed at convincing
the court that the education clause guarantees individual
rights, rather than simply spelling out discretionary legislative
duties, the litigant would be virtually guaranteed to win the
case” and have a court declare inadequacy.165 The existence of
certain constitutional text has virtually no bearing on whether
this argument can be successful. That a court would need to
reach such a conclusion about individual rights goes directly to
the issue of whether any justiciable remedy exists.
On the other hand, despite the fact that courts have
demonstrated that they are not bound by separation of powers
clauses, some state courts have found that their state
constitutions do not contain any substantive guarantee of
some level of educational opportunity.166 In these states, there
are few, if any, opportunities for litigants to convince courts
to prod state legislatures to give meaningful content to
positive educational rights, and there is no court-legislature
dynamic with which federal policies like NCLB and RTTT can
interfere. However, this does not mean that resort to the courts
in other states is misguided or unhelpful, even for those
students in states without constitutional guarantees of a
certain level of educational opportunity. Indeed, “trends in
education show a remarkable tendency to follow a national
pattern.”167 Even in those states in which the courts have a very
limited role, legislatures should pick up on trends from outside
of their borders, where the interplay between the legislature
and the courts is working. This would be problematic where

164

Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 374 (Colo. 2009) (reviewing education clause claims
for a rational basis); COLO. CONST. art IX, § 2. Bauries, supra note 161, also demonstrates
rather forcefully that separation of powers clauses do not preclude justiciability.
165
Bauries, supra note 161, at 750.
166
See, e.g., Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999) (declaring state
funding scheme a nonjusticiable political question); Charlet v. Legislature of State of
La., 713 So.2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Louisiana constitution requires only that State
provide a “minimum education” which was met because state funding levels amounted
to more than a “mere pittance.”).
167
Kagan, supra note 40, at 2265.
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educational systems in the neighboring states themselves are
doing poorly. A system that is doing poorly, however, also
sends a signal to try something else, and that something else
may yet yield positive results. But where reforms are
mandated, as through NCLB and RTTT, the ability of states
to innovate or pick up on trends is stunted.
If, however, reformers and advocates are uncomfortable
waiting for educational reform to trickle across state borders,
then the proper solution is to create a substantive right to
education, enforceable at the federal level through suits under
Section 1983 or otherwise through the courts.168 This solution,
though, is anathema to our traditional ideas about local
control of education, an idea engrained in decisions at both the
state and federal levels and an idea substantiated by the need
for educational policy to respond to local concerns.169 Further,
a federal right that is not lodged at the constitutional level
could, rather problematically, easily be repealed.170
A second problem with giving the courts a major role in
formulating education policy—and a concern that would also

168

Although the remedial scheme is somewhat complicated, this is generally the
approach taken with respect to students with learning disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1403
(2012) (abrogating state sovereign immunity for violations of Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and allowing for remedies both at law and equity
for violations of IDEA). The IDEA requires states to establish administrative
procedures for handling disputes as to the implementation of procedures required by
the IDEA, with different requirements established for the subchapters dealing with
children to age two, 20 U.S.C. § 1439 (2012), and those aged three to twenty-one, 20
U.S.C. § 1415 (2012). The circuits are currently split over whether a Section 1983 claim
may be brought for violations of the IDEA. See Candace Chun, Comment, The Use of

§ 1983 as a Remedy for Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
Why It Is Necessary and What It Really Means, 72 ALB. L. REV. 461, 482–90 (2009)

(five circuits disallowing such claims, two circuits allowing, two circuits with some
decisions recognizing such claims and others barring, and three circuits yet to rule on
the issue). Regardless of the availability of Section 1983 claims, the remedial scheme for
violations of the IDEA affecting those aged three to twenty-one provides for the
ability to appeal the administrative decision to “any State court of competent
jurisdiction or any district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in
controversy.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2012). In any case, the IDEA creates, for students
with disabilities, a substantive, enforceable entitlement to a “free appropriate public
education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2012).
169
See McGovern, supra note 12, at 1529–32.
170
Of course, a constitutional amendment could solve this problem, as well.
However, because it is so difficult to amend the Constitution, this Comment does not
consider this option seriously.
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exist by giving the federal courts a say in this arena—is the
inherently slow-moving nature of the court system. It takes a
significant amount of time for a case to work its way through
multiple levels of the court system. This delay would seem to
negate the flexibility required by an adequacy framework.
However, state courts, particularly in this context, do not
speak only through the final judgments of their highest
benches. In a system in which the courts are responsible for
prodding the legislature and fighting inertia, the elected
branches can also respond to filed suits, trial court orders, or
evidentiary studies commissioned specifically for education
litigation.171 That a court’s docket might be clogged does not
counsel against using the judiciary for these purposes. Even
filing a suit can have an effect, although it may take years for
any case to reach a state’s highest court.
None of these objections to judicial involvement in the
formulation of education policy is a sufficient response to the
claim that state courts should be given ample room to
effectuate state-level constitutional guarantees. These
objections do serve as correctives to any impulse to rely too
heavily on litigation as the medium of change in the realm of
educational policy, and it is no mistake that the political
dynamic outlined above envisions a significant role for the
political branches even given active judicial involvement.
Ultimately, however, the importance of education, its
constitutional stature on the state level, and the positive nature
of existing substantive educational guarantees are compelling
reasons to preserve a meaningful judicial role in educational
policymaking.
V. CONCLUSION
When we, as a nation, consider how best to provide
adequate educational opportunity to as many students as
possible, one critical question that must be answered is at what
level these decisions are best made. This means developing an
awareness of both where students may most effectively
vindicate their own interests and where these decisions may be
made most efficiently. NCLB and RTTT represent a belief
that education policy may be usefully directed, if not dictated,
at the federal level. As this Comment argues, these decisions
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are best made on the state level. Substantive constitutional
guarantees of education can be found in every state, entitling
students to an adequate level of educational opportunity.
These guarantees provide a role for both state courts and state
legislatures in vindicating the national educational interest in
ensuring educational opportunity for all.
The very nature of the educational right—positive in
character—requires active government involvement. As
Feldman recognizes, legislative inertia and not judicial
overreach is the primary barrier to adequate vindication of
positive rights.172 Part of this active government involvement
must come from the judicial branches, which are in a position
to prod the legislature to act where educational quality falls
below some minimally adequate level.
The judiciary is the ultimate defense against the legislative
inertia that threatens the ability of poor and minority students
to obtain an adequate education. Educational adequacy
litigation began to open new doors and expand beyond
funding precisely at the moment that federal involvement,
through NCLB and RTTT, began to grow to such a level as to
threaten to interfere with judicial intervention in education.173
This potential pitfall is precisely the reason why the federal
government should not take such an active role in education.
Courts are important players in education reform not by
articulating the content of educational policy but by setting
the rules governing how education reform can proceed.
Educational reform involves an important give and take as
interested parties advance their own solutions, but there are
constitutional limits on this give and take that should be
defined by state courts. The experience of educational
adequacy lawsuits indicates that there is an important political
dynamic at play here, which involves courts and ultimately
inures to the benefit of students, as all education reform
should.
To the extent that the federal government is involved,
through programs like NCLB and RTTT, that involvement has
the potential to diminish the effectiveness of state legislative
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response to state courts by binding the legislature to the
requirements of federal funding programs. Thus, through
NCLB and RTTT, the federal government threatens this
valuable political dynamic in which courts play an important
role in vindicating the substantive educational entitlements
enjoyed by students. Although state legislatures may be able to
respond to both the federal government and to state courts
simultaneously, the very real possibility that state legislatures
may, in some instances, be placed in an untenable position
between federal requirements and state court dictates should
counsel against extensive federal involvement in education.
An adequacy framework for educational policy requires
more than that a state legislature commit to a certain level of
education funding. It requires also that a legislature be
sensitive to the ways in which educational policies, especially
those that go beyond the funding context, affect student
performance and achievement. NCLB and RTTT focus
legislatures in ways that may not actually be helpful. These
policies may have any number of constitutionally relevant
consequences, particularly for poor and minority students.
There is a role for courts to play in educational policy, and
that role is to make sure that legislatures remain sensitive to
the ways educational policies affect students and especially
that they remain sensitive to the unique challenges posed to
racially and socioeconomically isolated students within our
educational systems and society. State constitutional text
demands that closing the achievement gap cannot merely be a
legislative priority. State courts cannot effectively play that
role in a system riddled with federal commands. There are
reasons for federal involvement in local educational policy,
but protection of student interests counsels in favor of more
restrained involvement, rather than the ever-expanding role
the federal government has given itself in the last decade.

